No matter how long you’ve been in the note business, you will always find so much variability in the outcome from one deal to another. In this episode, Dan Deppen reviews the numbers from twenty recently exited note deals. He focuses on the average returns, as well as the highs and lows. He also deep dives into selling REO properties and how the sale process of an REO can be significantly lower than the initial BPO estimate of the value, wrapping it up with a summary of adjustments he’s been making to his notes business to improve results.
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Lessons Learned From 20 Note Deals
I’m going to be talking about some lessons learned from twenty note deals that I’ve exited. I’ve talked about lessons learned in the past. That’s something I’m big on when I close deals. I want to always be updating the model for my note business. Originally, I was going to put together some case studies because it’s been a little while since I’ve put those out. I have a ton of deals that have closed that I have not built case studies for what to build those out on the Fusion Notes’ website and do some other things with them. In the process of starting to work on those, I drifted towards putting together some portfolio-level data on things like returns, costs, and a lot of different things. I went deep down the rabbit hole over that.
I was able to pull out some pretty good insights that will be helping me make some adjustments in my business. One of the big things that I’ve been working on as well is updating my pricing model. My ROI calculator is something that I’ve updated regularly for the last few years. That’s evolved a lot over time. I put together a different version of it. That was more intended to look at bidding on entire portfolios where you might have 10 to 50 notes in them at a time. I refer to it as my Turbo Pricer. The only reason I call it that is when I worked at Oracle, we had this fancy spreadsheet for doing estimates and pricing out storage hardware and they called it the Turbo Pricer. I’ve adopted that.
As I’ve gathered this portfolio-level data, some of the insights towards pricing and costs have been pretty unique. I thought I would share it here. I don’t know if I’ve ever seen anyone share data quite like this. I’m going to share for the most part the averages and not as much get into the specific deals. Probably next time, if I don’t have an interview, I’ll cover some of the case studies or if not, the one after that. One big word of warning before I start diving into that stuff is that the data I’m presenting are averages for a number of deals. One of the big takeaways from this little study is how much variability there is in outcomes from the deal to deal.
This is an average over a sample of twenty deals. When you buy an individual note, the results you get may be completely different. Part of that’s the variance. It could be that you’re buying using a different model than what I’m using or you could have a different approach to doing the workout. I don’t want anybody to take these numbers as, if you do a nonperforming note or a nonperforming CFD, this is what’s going to happen because it’s not. The other interesting thing is that I’ve been able to tighten things up over time. This sample of twenty deals, these were all initiated, for the most part, the second half of 2018. I’ve made a lot of changes since then anyways. Looking at the numbers now is going to help me make a few more adjustments. As we go along, I’ll talk about what I’ve been updating.
Talking about this, the dataset to start. These were twenty nonperforming notes, mostly contracts for deeds. These were all ones that I had done joint ventures on as well. For the most part, entered into the second half of 2018. As far as the outcomes of the twenty, nine of them became REOs that I sold either through a foreclosure or a forfeiture, which is often the process on a contract for deed or a deed in lieu where the borrower agreed to sign over the property in exchange for a payment. It’s called a Cash for Keys deal. The other eleven were able to get them re-performing and then sold them as re-performing notes.
The sample is a little skewed as far as the percentage of REOs, the percentage of re-performing notes. I did not go in yet and look at the data on the nonperforming notes say by how many re-perform because a lot of my re-performers, the partners like to hold onto them for a while. Whereas in this sample, these are ones that I exited. There are a lot more than I did in this timeframe that are performing and holding onto. When I looked at it a while back, it seemed like there were about two thirds or so I would get to re-perform. I suspect these numbers might be a little bit higher right now, but I need to go back and look at those. Here, almost half became REOs, but that’s not the case on a running basis. For this data set, that’s what I have.
The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly
Talking about some of the numbers in terms of returns. Again, this isn’t to suggest that if you buy a note, this is what you’re going to get or on my future deals, this is what I’ll end up seeing. This is the results of a specific sample with the good, the bad, and the ugly thrown in. The total ROI for the joint venture partners on these and these were joint ventures set up with a 50/50 profit split. The investor who put up the funding for the deal got their money back first, assuming there was enough money to pay them back entirely, and then profits were split 50/50 after that. The average ROI to the joint venture investor, this was after the profits split, was 10.9%.
The annualized return so there’s a function in Excel called XIRR, you can do to calculate the annualized return, which if a deal runs for a while can be a more meaningful metric. The XIRR is not as interesting because sometimes they go fast as if the borrower signs off on a deed in lieu. Whether it was a big winner, a big loser, that value gets magnified. The annualized return average was 11.5%. It’s fairly close to the ROI. Meaning on average these were running about a year or so, probably a little bit under. It’s not so bad. That means if you’re doing these with your own money following this model in this timeframe, you probably see around 20% returns.
A lot of times, the people who promote the industry downplay some of the risks. Click To TweetLooking At The ROI
I want to caution people on that because there’s a lot of variability in that. These were all ones that were cherry-picked. These were bought 1 to 4 at a time, often going through a large tape of hundreds of CFDs and picking the couple that looked the best. The first big word of caution is if you look at the ROI so that we have that average of 10.9%. The biggest winner was 68% and that was 68% after the split of the JV. It made over 100%. It was a forfeiture and a contract for deed and basically, the borrower forfeited a lot of equity. The borrower did some things that didn’t make sense for them. The low was negative at 14.1%. I have lost money on note deals or a handful in here that went red. I’ll talk about that a little more.
When I get into some of the case studies in the future, I’m going to talk about those as well. I know if you go out on BiggerPockets or you talk to some of the gurus and things, they act as if they’ve never lost money on a note deal. That’s not the case. These things are very volatile, especially when you’re doing nonperformers and you run into these situations, where you can inspect the inside of the house. You can’t predict borrower behavior. If you do enough of these, things are going to get wacky at some point. That’s something I’m going to talk about in a little more detail in the future. A lot of times, some people who promote the industry downplay some of the risks.
The overall average returns are high. It’s like any other investment if you think about it. If you’re buying stocks or doing other things, usually with the potential for higher reward goes high risk in more variants. That’s the same thing here. There’s nothing special about notes that defies the Laws of Physics or investing. It makes sense if you think about it. Going forward, I want to talk more and more about that to set the expectations. The other thing I’ve noticed too is as I’ve had more conversations with some higher-level people who were running some funds that have been around for a while, I’ve heard some real horror stories of deals that have gone south. These are from people who know what they’re doing.
Knock on wood, I haven’t had anything like that happen, but I have had some get sideways. The next thing I’ve had learned if you break this down to the ones that re-performed, of those eleven, that re-performed, the return to the JV partners after the split was about 12% to 25% on an annualized basis, which is great. What happens here is if you can get it re-performing, assuming you’re buying it at a decent price, when it’s non-performing, those times you do get them to re-perform and get them back on track, you can do it well. The rub is when that doesn’t work and you take the property back, that’s when things get dicey and get all over the place.
My next point here was in these scenarios where you end up with an REO, the returns are all over the map. My high and low ROI examples that 68% after the split and then the negative 14%, those were both scenarios where I ended up taking the property back. It was the same partner. I was working on both of those as well. The other reason I want to make people more tuned in to some of the risks with these and understanding what can happen is those are with the same partner. We got 68% first, which was the massive home run. The minus 14% came some number of months later. That partner was doing great but I was not happy at all when that minus 14% came out. Some of that is on me for not necessarily setting the expectations and educating people on what can happen with these.
I’ll do some case studies on those down the road. One of the big takeaways for me though is I’m going to continue to do joint ventures, but as a lot of people know I have the fusion income fund now. By doing a fund model and doing these in large groups, you’re tamping down that volatility. There’s going to be a 10%, 11% return overall. Within that, there are going to be some that are steady, some that are home run, some that go red. It all washes out when you do it in that model. Note investing, I’m increasingly convinced, is more and more of a numbers game.
The Selling Costs
If you can build a good model, scale it efficiently, do a lot of notes, then you can let the numbers work their magic. If you’re doing 1 or 2, there’s absolutely nothing wrong with that. The actual results you get could be all over the map. They could be amazingly good. They could be amazingly bad. I don’t want to cherry-pick the good ones. I want to try to give people all the data. There were no exits in this period that I threw out or anything like that. Moving on now, I’ll talk about where I was selling these nine REOs and some of the data around those. One of the things I’m doing right is I’m picking this data and I want to feed it into my pricing model.
When you look at the selling costs, the price that I sold the property for versus the net proceeds after the sale, after realtor commission, taxes, and other closing costs was about $3,800 overall. It worked out to about 9% of the selling price, which isn’t too bad. I had always assumed that it was going to be 10%. That was a rule of thumb that I’ve used. The thing to point out is that when you have sales where the home sells for $25,000 or less since some of your commissions can be fixed, then your selling costs ended up being like 20% to 25% in that case. That’s why I don’t target assets that are going to sell for $25,000 or less. In some of these cases, I got nasty surprises on the inside. That’s where it ended up.
The other thing is I’ve started to do more private party sales versus using a realtor. My model has been when I get an REO, trying to get rid of it quickly, list it with a realtor, usually the one who did my BPO. I was working with them and have them take care of it. Get rid of it and sell it to a cash buyer. That is fine. You can save a lot of money on the selling costs by doing it yourself. I did one that was not in this sample because I haven’t exited the deal yet, but I did seller finance. I put an ad on Craigslist and put an ad on Facebook Marketplace and sold it for my full asking price, which was a lot more than what my realtor was suggesting I do and I did way better. That’s one of the areas where I will be able to improve my exits a little bit.
The next piece of data that you might find scary, this has been surprising to me versus what I was assuming when I did most of these deals originally. I look at what was the sale price of the property compared to the BPO value that I had when I bought the note. I typically pull a BPO and it gives you a 30-day quick sale value and then usually it gives you like a 60 to 90-day list value. Over the sample of these, the sale price averaged about 60% of my BPO value. Think about that. That means if I had a BPO of $40,000, my sale price was $24,000 and that’s pretty bad. I was not assuming it would be that low. I’ll explain why I think that is.
Build a good model, scale it efficiently, do a lot of notes, then let the numbers work their magic. Click To TweetThere was a lot of variation in that value as well because there’s a lot of variation in the inside condition when you get these things back. I sold these anywhere from 19% to 100% of the BPO. The one that was 19% was the one that had the minus 14% return to the investor. On that one, I had a BPO that was $103,500 and sold it for $20,000. That probably the other reason the partner was mad, they were basically like, “How does that happen?” I wanted to know the same thing. The outside of the house looked fine. There wasn’t like junk in the yard. It wasn’t pristine, but it didn’t look bad.
We got in there, the inside of the house was trashed. It was a mess. They had animals in there. It turned out somehow there was only one bathroom. They’re supposed to be two. It was a sad situation because they had kids in there and stuff. It was pretty bad. The BPO was bad, to begin with, but there were several factors. One hand, it’s a cautionary tale of what can happen when you take a property back. On the other hand, it wasn’t that big a loss. Think about it, if you do other forms of real estate deals and the value of your property is less than 20% of what you thought it was, you’re probably going to lose a lot more than 14%.
That’s one of the nice things about notes is you’re buying these things at a discount. You have a lot of weasel room to maneuver a deal with that volatility. Sale price is about 60% of the value of my BPOs. The net proceeds as a percentage of the BPO so I’m selling it for 60% of the BPO. I’ve got my selling costs, commissions, taxes, whatever. That was about 52%. If my BPO is $40,000, that means when I got the property back and sold it, I was netting about a little over $20,000. With a lot of variation in there, but it’s a good example of some of the costs that you want to have. I’ll point out too that a lot of these contracts for deeds, with sub $100,000 BPO value. Those tend to go upside down sooner.
The other thing that affected these is a lot of these I wanted to sell quickly. I was selling them often to local cash buyers. Your local cash buyers aren’t going to pay a whole lot, but because often the condition is rough, I didn’t want to mess with a retail buyer. Those cash buyers, if they’re flippers or whatever, a lot of them we use a formula that’s like 70% of the ARV minus repairs. There are lots of repairs and they don’t want to end up offering you that much. However, as I’ve started doing more seller finance, that opens the aperture on who you can sell to and you can often get a much better price.
Those are some of the ways I’ve been adjusting things. My typical selling costs were about $3,800, but with some of the adjustments I’m making ongoing, I’m going to assume it’s probably about $3,000 because I’ll still use realtors for a lot of these certain cities. I have some amazing realtors, but in other areas, I don’t. I’m also going to assume net proceeds of about 60% of the BPO. The reason I can go to 60% versus the 52% is part of this is by doing these private party sales, offering seller finance and dealing with fewer cash buyers who are going to not be willing to pay as much.
The expenses for deals going into the REO, one of the things I do on every deal is in QuickBooks. When I’m doing my accounting, I’ve got an account for the note itself, where I track the purchase price of the note and then subtract principal payments. I’ve got another account for all of the holding costs for that note. I looked at those nine where they ended up as REOs, the foreclosure forfeiture, or deed in lieu. I looked at all of the costs together. I included servicing, force-placed insurance, clean out expenses if there was a cleanout. This was everything, but those selling costs and commissions at the end and if there was a Cash for Keys deal, then that cash paid went into these as well. If they were delinquent taxes that went into this number.
That average overall was $7,250, which is about in line with what I had anticipated going in. There’s variation state to state and whether you can do a forfeiture or whether you can do a foreclosure and what your legal expenses are going to be and your timelines, but this is where it averaged out. There was a reasonable amount of consistency. There was one that was a little over $15,000 because I had to do $4,000 or $5,000 in rehab on that one. It was a little longer legal process. However, since then I’ve made some changes. There was a servicer I was using for some of these, which was very expensive.
I was using them to do the workout and dragged things out longer. By having these at Madison and Allied, I cut down a lot of that cost and cut down the timeline. I’ve also got better networks on the ground so I have a better network of realtors and property managers in at least the number of cities. I’ve also gotten better at using Craigslist for some of the random jobs that you need to be done like cleanouts and other things. The $7,250 going forward, I’m going to assume that’s probably going to be about $7,000. That’s pretty reasonable. I can probably knock it down lower than that by being more efficient in my operations and in the vendors that I’m using.
For these deals that become REOs, if I know that my proceeds from the sale are going to be about 60% of my BPO and my average expenses are going to be about $7,000, then what price would I have to pay for a note to break even as a function of the BPO? For example, let’s say the BPO is $20,000. I wouldn’t buy one that has a BPO of $20,000, but let’s say we did. If the BPO is $20,000 and my proceeds from the sale are 60%, that means I’m at a net of $12,000. If my expenses were $7,000, then that means I’ve got $5,000 left to play with. If I want to break even on that deal, I better not pay more than $5,000 for that note, which works out to about 25% of the BPO.
Lessons Learned
That’s the break-even. That’s not to make a profit. If I wanted to make a 20% ROI, I would only be able to pay $3,000 for that $20,000 BPO property. I’m ignoring the unpaid balance, which matters if we’re getting this re-performing. I’m looking at this from the standpoint of the scenario where the property is going to become an REO. One of the things you should be doing in your ROI calculator is looking at different scenarios. This is how I’m looking at the scenarios where it becomes an REO. If you’re looking at one specific note, you’re going to care a lot about the state that it’s in and the specific legal costs there and the timelines and some other things. If you’re looking at a portfolio of 30 or 40 contracts for deeds, a lot of these averages are probably going to work out. With the chart, I built it out between $20,000 up to BPO of $100,000.
As an example, if our BPO is $50,000, then our sales proceeds are going to be 60% of that. It will be $30,000. We have $7,000 in costs. The breakeven price we can pay for the note is going to be about $23,000. If you want to make 20%, we’re going to have to be into it for $18,000, the price of the note. If you want to get to 40% or better, it’ll be like a little over $14,000. It’s a quick, easy way to get a ballpark idea of what your return is going to be if you end up taking the property back. I keep harping on this, but again, there’s a lot of variation. An average might be 60%, but your one deal could be 100% like I’ve had before, or hopefully, you don’t end up on the low end where you’re selling it for 30% or 40% of the BPO. That can easily happen.
Some lessons learned and one of the big ones here you’ve seen is that in the scenario where a property becomes an REO, you’re not going to realize your equity. A lot of deals on paper look like they have a ton of equity. You might see a loan with an $80,000 BPO and a $40,000 balance. You think, “If I take this back, I’m going to be way better off than it if it performs.” That could happen. Most of the time it’s not going to. The reason is if that property is worth $80,000, usually the borrower is not going to let you capture that equity, unless they have a drug problem or some issue or they’re crazy and they do something silly. I had one borrower do, but that was only one. If the equity is there, you’re not going to see it.
One of the nice things about notes is you're buying these things at a discount and you have a lot of room to maneuver that volatility. Click To TweetWhen a borrower gives up and either sign off on a deed in lieu and says, “I’m out of here,” or rides the ship down in foreclosure, they do that when it makes sense for them too. Meaning, there are problems with the property. The property is wrecked. I’ve found when I’ve gotten deed in lieu when I first started getting those, I would get all pumped up and excited. I’ve found that if a borrower’s quick to sign a deed in lieu or if they’ve already vacated it, it usually means there’s something wrong with the house, for the most part. If the borrower is willing to hand it over quick, there’s probably something wrong on the inside.
That’s at least what I’ve seen about almost every time so far. I’ll give you one example. It took all the way through the foreclosure process. It took a little longer than it should’ve but got through the foreclosure and I was getting ready to start the eviction process. This was a borrower I was never able to contact. They were completely off the grid. I knew they were living there. I had visited the property before, walked right in front of it. The outside was pretty nice, all in all. It’s much nicer than some of the other deals that I’ve done. After the foreclosure, we’re getting ready to start doing the eviction, the borrower calls me out of the blue and says, “I’m letting you know moving out on Saturday.”
He’s the nicest guy in the world. I’m like, “I don’t have to do the eviction.” When we got in there, for one, the inside was pretty trashed. They had these dogs. There were a dog smell and poop everywhere. We had to take on some rehab work for that. We noticed later that the furnace was dead. The heat exchanger was cracked. The furnace was toast. I got to think and I’m like, “This guy, all of a sudden, was ready to leave.” It was in the fall. It was like late October, early November. This was in Indiana when it started getting cold. When the furnace was dead, he wasn’t going to spend whatever was going to cost a couple of thousand dollars for a furnace.
He knew he was getting evicted anyway, so at that point, he was ready to go. When he was all of a sudden ready to go, it meant something was wrong. The other thing is the borrowers who tend to ride the ship down in a foreclosure or a forfeiture, those people tend to live pretty rough. A lot of these contracts for deeds, the payments are often between $300 and $400. Sometimes it’s less than rent. Somebody who isn’t going to pay anything even on that for a long time, they live a rough lifestyle. What you find the inside isn’t good. The bottom line is this doesn’t mean that of all the notes you buy, the sale value is 60% of the BPO value.
What it means is when the BPO value is what you think it is, the borrower is probably going to perform. It’s never going to end up as an REO and you’re not going to see that equity. The ones where the equity is not there because there are hidden problems on the inside, those are the ones you see. The data can fool you in a way. It doesn’t mean that every BPO is off by a very large percentage, but of the ones that you see as REOs, those are going to be the ones where the BPO is the most off if that makes any sense. The question is why else are these BPO values so far off? I’ll talk about some possible reasons. I’m sure every case is different and I can’t say definitively why.
This might be a good thing to have a realtor on to talk about, but these are some possible reasons and some of my basic speculations call on that. One reason is what I’ve noticed reviewing a lot of my BPOs is a lot of times the realtor will deduct from the value for things they see on the outside and they’ll say, “I see you have an issue on the roof. I see a structural issue. I see something else and we’ll have deductions. I see a broken window,” or whatever. They’ll make deductions for that. They make no deductions for the inside because they don’t have a view of the inside. What they’re doing in effect is assuming that the inside is pristine. The inside is never pristine.
I don’t think the inside of my house is pristine. I’m talking about somebody who’s going to ride a ship down in a forfeiture instead of making a $300 payment. They’re not living a lifestyle where the inside is going to be tiptop. The other thing that happens sometimes is you do get bad realtors who use bad comps or don’t understand the neighborhood. When I first started getting some data on these, when I started taking these back and realizing how different they were from the BPOs, I started pulling two BPOs for a little while. Sometimes I would get two BPOs and they would be radically different. Sometimes they’re far apart.
I would call the realtors back and ask them about it. There was one case in particular where I don’t remember the exact numbers, but I think one had a BPO value of like $80,000 and the other one was saying like $25,000 or $30,000. I was like, “What’s going on?” I called them both and the one with the low value knew the neighborhood. She was like, “There’s was some factory nearby. There are three other houses on that street that are boarded up. There’s this and there’s that.” You could tell from talking to her that she knew what she was doing. I trusted her value and ended up canceling that offer.
The other thing that I think is a possibility. I’m sure it happened somewhere. I don’t know that this has ever happened. If your realtor has a conflict of interest, you’re not necessarily going to know especially if you’re selling to local cash buyers in a market that you’re not active in. There’s the possibility that the realtor comes back and says, “This has been on the market for a while and I’ve only got this one offer. How do you know that it’s not their buddy or even another LLC that they have an interest in?” I’m not saying that’s ever happened. I don’t think it has, but I have had some interactions with realtors that I didn’t trust.
There’s a potential for it. I’m not saying that’s something that happens all over the place. In some cases, selling these on my own, doing it through seller finance and getting away from the cash buyers, eliminates some of those concerns. The reason they’re bad is I already beat this to death, but the borrower is more likely to let the property go if it’s in bad shape. The assets with bad BPOs, those are the ones you see as REOs that you ended up selling. The ones that were at good BPOs, they were going to perform, they’ll never be selling that property, except in some rare cases where the borrower does something irrational. It can happen, but it’s not common.
What adjustments have I been making? I’ve talked about some of them. A little bit of it as avoiding certain servicers. Using the wrong servicer can be very expensive and also increase your timeline unless you are a large fund where you can hold the stick to them. I’m not going to name names on any of them or at least any of the bad names. The ones that I’ve been using who have been very good to me are Allied and Madison’s been good. I’ve got one at Main Street that’s been good. You want to be a little choosy about getting the wrong servicer and depending on them can be a mess. If you have the right ones and take a lot of things in your own hands, it can work out better.
One of the adjustments we’ll be making too is probably relying more on photos of assets and doing my comps than the BPOs. I had Justin Bogard on a while back. He was talking about how he tends to do his own instead of relying on BPOs. I’ve got a pretty decent sample size and dug into my data. I can see why he ended up doing that. I may still pull some BPOs here and there, but I’ll probably be relying on them less. Since there’s going to be that much variation and that much difference in selling price, I can use other methods to probably be about as accurate overall. Although I’ll probably still want to talk to realtors and have somebody lined up on the ground.
Many deals on paper look like they have a ton of equity, but most of the time, they don’t. Click To TweetI’m doing more off-market sales and seller finance. I had Tracy Rewey on a while back too talking about seller financing. I took a lot of the things she said there to heart. Now that I’ve started to do that, you can come out way better. Getting away from the cash buyers, you open the aperture on the number of people that you can sell to. You can get better pricing because you’re selling on terms. The point of price comparison for the buyer is more the payment on the new note that you’re creating compared to what it would cost to rent a place. Versus some fix and flip investor who’s got a tight situation where they’re going to be very price sensitive.
I’m becoming more cautious about deals that are likely to end up as REO. We haven’t talked about here and I’ve got some more analysis to do here is looking at which deals are more likely to end up as REOs. Some of these that were re-performing were not that far behind. Although they were non-performing who are not that far behind had a lot of payments in the last twelve months. A lot of mines that became REOs, I knew was going to be REOs going in or either bought them when the foreclosure was about to start. I did these as one-off deals. I’m still going to do them when they make sense, but I’m going to be a little more cautious.
The other thing that I knew already was, especially if you’re looking at lower value assets that may be in REO, you need to be super cautious because of what I was talking about before. When you look at your proceeds being 60% of BPO and you might have $7,000 in costs, you can get in trouble quickly if the value is low. The other thing that might make a good topic in the future is using a probabilistic pricing model or doing more of a Monte Carlo analysis. I’ve been doing this for a while, but I’ve been refining it based on some of my data. You know how when you do an ROI calculator, you’ll look at different scenarios.
I look at different scenarios. I’ll look at the ROI for those scenarios and look at based on the loan characteristics, what’s the probability that it becomes an REO? What’s the probability that it re-performs? You use the return for each and the probability to come up with the expected return. Within an individual deal, you’re going to have a lot of variation. If you do that over a portfolio, you can start to get a lot of more predictable results overall. That’s something I’ve been adjusting. I’m going to continue to refine that as I move along. That was an analysis of the last twenty deals that I’ve looked at. If you have other information you’re looking for or other statistics and things, let me know. You can always drop me an email at Dan@FusionNotes.com. The last thing I’ll wrap up with, I haven’t talked about this a lot. I need to do some in this subject as well. It’s my Systematic Due Diligence Training course. I put this together because as I was selling a lot of these re-performing notes, I had a lot of buyers who were first-time note buyers struggling with the due diligence process. A lot of times I was helping them with it.
In some cases, they would walk away from a deal because they weren’t comfortable and they didn’t know how to do it, sometimes even when they took some very expensive training courses. What I did was I put together an online training course. It’s about seven hours of videos, but then it’s got all my spreadsheets and automation tools that I use for due diligence. You can follow the cookie-cutter process to do due diligence on first position residential notes. I’ve also got a private Facebook group as part of that. I’ve been doing regular updates to the course as we go along. I was trying to develop a cool little community. It’s been a lot of fun. There’s a lot of details and you can get the actual spreadsheets and stuff in there. It’s only $495 for the course. I’ve also got it set up now where you can do payments over six months if you want. If you have any questions about that, you can either go to SystematicDueDiligence.com. There’s also a link to it on FusionNotes.com or you can drop me an email at Dan@FusionNotes.com and I can send you some information on that. Thanks for reading. I will catch everyone next time. Thanks.
Important Links:
- BiggerPockets
- Justin Bogard – Past episode
- Tracy Rewey – Past episode
- QuickBooks
- Dan@FusionNotes.com
- www.SystematicDueDiligence.com
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